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Abstract
The largest oil-producing countries are some of the world’s most concentrated economies, and
their economic development is primarily reliant on oil exports. The low carbon transition threat-
ens to cut their export revenues as we gradually shift to the consumption of low carbon energy
sources, forcing these countries to diversify into other sectors. This bachelor’s degree final project
aims to study whether oil-producing countries have more concentrated exports than other coun-
tries. To answer this question, a large unbalanced panel of 154 countries is collected for the years
1995-2014, and a fixed-effects model is estimated using two different approaches that identify
the major oil-producing countries. The results of this study suggest that export concentration
is a concern in the main oil-producing economies and must be addressed in order to ensure
sustainable long-term economic growth.
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Low carbon transition has become inevitable as the World tries to find successful policy measures
against global warming. This means that energy use and production output would gradually
turn away from polluting fossil fuels into renewable sources. However, while the speed at which
this transition occurs is still unclear, the European Union is attempting to set the pace by
becoming the first climate-neutral continent by the year 2050. As more than 75% of the unions’
greenhouse gas emissions are related to energy, current policies aim to increase energy efficiency
and eventually replace fossil fuels with renewables. According to some estimations, this would
decrease the European Union’s oil and gas import dependence from 55% to 20% in 2050, making
fossil fuel exporters potentially lose part of their market (European Commission, 2018). However,
the European Union is not the only party that is gradually switching to renewable energy; in
2015, 196 countries signed the Paris agreement on climate change (UNFCCC, n.d.).
Oil-producing countries have historically been among theWorld’s most specialized economies.
”In 2010 the fifteen countries with the highest export concentration scores in the World were all
petroleum exporters” (Ross, 2019). Therefore, the low carbon transition does not come cost-free
to countries whose economic growth is highly dependent on the performance of these fossil fuel
exports or where these revenues are a significant source of fiscal revenues. To give an example of
the extreme, export revenues from oil and natural gas in Iraq and Kuwait represented around 40%
of their GDP and almost 70% of the fiscal revenues of Saudi Arabia in 2017 (Tagliapietra, 2019).
If part of these export revenues are lost and cannot be compensated by growth in other sectors,
it can have severe consequences on the economic development of these economies and may result
in geopolitical instability (Bradshaw et al., 2019). Thus, to guarantee sustainable growth in the
future, the countries that are currently heavily dependent on fossil fuel revenues are gradually
forced to diversify their economies. As it is quite evident that the export concentration has
become a significant problem in some of the biggest oil-producing countries, one may question
whether this problem extends to all oil-producing economies in general.
Following the practices used in the previous empirical literature, this bachelor’s degree final
project will study whether oil-producing economies have a comparatively more concentrated
export structure in relation to other countries. To study this question, I will estimate a fixed-
effects model using an unbalanced panel data that consists of 154 countries and ranges from 1995
to 2014. The idea of using a fairly large panel is to include both oil producers that are heavily
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dependent on these revenues, together with relatively smaller and more diversified producers in
the analysis.
The rest of the document will be structured as follows: In Section 2, I will introduce the
related empirical research with an emphasis on the determinants of export diversification. Then
in Section 3, I will present the research methodology and the methods used in this study, as well
as the data that was gathered for these purposes. Finally, Section 4 will present and discuss the
results obtained using the fixed-effects model(s), and Section 5 will conclude the study.
2 Previous empirical research
A thorough understanding of how export diversification has been studied in the past is needed
to determine if oil-producing countries have comparatively more concentrated (less diversified)
exports. This section will review the relevant empirical literature of the possible determinants
of export diversification and other relevant papers that have studied the relationship between
export concentration and income volatility. The aim is to summarize the key results of the
empirical papers that serve as the foundation for this final project’s econometric analysis.
2.1 The determinants of export diversification
The possible determinants of export diversification have been studied in the past by many
authors (Agosin et al., 2012; Giri et al., 2019; Osakwe & Kilolo, 2018; Parteka & Tamberi,
2011). Although the focus has been on identifying possible variables that affect the degree of
export diversification, the empirical methods used by the authors have varied. The researchers
have primarily used various standard index measures of export diversification as the dependent
variables (e.g. Gini, Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschmann), but other approaches have also been
taken. It has also become a common practice to carry out robustness checks by estimating the
same models using more than one measure of export diversification.
The domestic market size is thought to be related to the degree of export diversification
because of its effect on the level of domestic demand and the number of companies. Parteka and
Tamberi (2011) studied the possible determinants of export diversification by estimating a fixed-
effects regression model with instrumental variables approach. The authors used the relative
Theil index as their primary measure of export diversification but tested for the robustness of
their findings by repeating the estimations with the relative Gini index. Their findings indicated
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that small economies (in terms of population) were, on average, associated with a lower degree
of export diversification (higher export concentration). More recent research has supported
the findings of Parteka and Tamberi (2011). Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) studied the export
diversification of developing countries using the relative Theil index and the number of export
lines as the measures of export diversification. The authors’ fixed-effects IV1 estimates revealed
a positive relationship between domestic market size and export diversification, and its effect
was statistically significant on both measures of export diversification. Later, Giri et al. (2019)
analyzed a panel of 92 countries and performed the analysis on different subsamples of countries
according to their characteristics. The authors estimated their models using Bayesian Model
Averaging and pooled OLS with the total, within and between Theil index as the measures of
export diversification and found evidence that smaller economies were predisposed to have more
concentrated exports.
The GDP per capita of a country has been thought to have a similar effect on the degree
of export diversification as population. It has been often included as a proxy for economic
development and domestic demand. Parteka and Tamberi (2011) found evidence that poor
economies (measured with GDP and GDP per capita) were on average associated with lower
levels of export diversification. Similar results were obtained by Giri et al. (2019) as they reported
a negative relationship between GDP per capita and export concentration when the full sample
of 92 countries was used. However, its effect was not statistically significant.
In this area of research, other factors related to economic development have also been re-
garded as possible factors affecting export diversification. The production structure of an econ-
omy proved to be the most significant driver of export diversification in the models of Osakwe
and Kilolo (2018). The authors’ regressions showed a positive association with manufacturing
value-added as a percent of GDP with export diversification. Also, the effect of infrastruc-
ture quality on export diversification was studied by Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) and Giri et al.
(2019). Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) used fixed telephone subscriptions and the level of energy
consumption as proxies for infrastructure. Their findings revealed that infrastructure quality
positively affects export diversification, implying that countries with better infrastructure have
a more diverse export base. These findings were later confirmed by Giri et al. (2019), who used
both fixed and mobile telephone subscriptions as infrastructure proxies. The authors found a
negative relationship in most of their regressions between these variables when using the full
1Instrumental variables
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sample. While the empirical evidence obtained by Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) and Giri et al.
(2019) seems to agree that infrastructure quality can be important for export diversification, the
use of telephone connectivity as a sole measure to capture this relationship may be questionable.
Furthermore, Giri et al. (2019) also discovered that higher institutional quality (proxied by the
quality of governance) was associated with higher export diversification. Therefore, low quality
of infrastructure and high levels of corruption may contribute to the ability of a country to
diversify its exports efficiently.
The connection between openness and export diversification has also attracted the attention
of some researchers. The theoretical relationship between openness and economic concentration
is somewhat related to the international trade theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, where
specialization is encouraged due to differences in the relative production capabilities. Using a
dynamic panel model approach and testing for the robustness of their findings using three differ-
ent measures of export diversification, Agosin et al. (2012) discovered that export diversification
was negatively and robustly linked to trade openness, meaning that trade liberalization could
contribute to export concentration. However, more recent literature finds little support to the
findings of Agosin et al. (2012) as Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) and Giri et al. (2019) both found
proof of a positive relationship between trade openness and export diversification. Therefore,
it appears that the relationship between export diversification and trade openness is dependent
on the sample and estimation methods used.
One of the factors that can influence a country’s degree of export diversification is hu-
man capital accumulation. Agosin et al. (2012) found out that human capital accumulation
(education) has a positive effect on export diversification and argued that with higher human
capital accumulation, countries could shift from the production of commodities to more human
capital-intensive industries, such as manufactured goods and services, which can foster better
possibilities for diversification. Giri et al. (2019) used three levels of human capital accumula-
tion in their models to see if different levels of human capital accumulation have different effects
on export diversification. According to the results obtained in Giri et al. (2019), depending
on the characteristics of the economy, different levels of human capital accumulation proved to
be more significant in relation to export diversification. For example, in the case of emerging
and developing commodity exporters, the increase in secondary school enrollment was the most
significant factor driving diversification. In the case of diversified emerging and developing ex-
porters, tertiary school enrollment proved to be the most significant. When these authors used
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the full sample, primary education was the most important factor driving export diversification.
Therefore, according to Giri et al. (2019), economies should focus on different levels of human
capital accumulation depending on their individual characteristics if they wish to diversify their
export base. These findings of Giri et al. (2019) seem to agree with the hypothesis developed by
Agosin et al. (2012), where higher levels of human capital accumulation are linked with higher
export diversification.
Other factors that may force economies to specialize are high export costs that may arise
from tariffs or quotas or simply due to unfavorable location with poor logistic chains. The
geographical distance from main markets was included in the models of Parteka and Tamberi
(2011) and Agosin et al. (2012). In the models of Parteka and Tamberi (2011), a greater distance
from the nearest major market was correlated with a higher export concentration. Similarly,
in most of their regressions, Agosin et al. (2012) found a positive association between economic
distance and export concentration. Parteka and Tamberi (2011) also found out that better
trade conditions (low tariffs or quotas, or being an active member in a trade agreement) were
associated with higher export diversification. This finding appears to be rational, as export
sectors exposed to high tariffs or quotas lose competitiveness compared to local rivals, which
can reduce their demand if these costs are not absorbed by profit margins and must be passed
on to the end customer as price increases.
Variables that are more closely related to the research question raised in this final project have
also been investigated previously. Alsharif, Bhattacharyya, and Intartaglia (2017) studied the
diversification trends of 35 petroleum exporter countries between 1962 and 2012. Instead of using
an index measure of export diversification, these authors took a different approach by regressing
non-oil exports (as a percentage of total exports) and non-oil private sector employment against
the logarithm of oil rents per capita. The researchers discovered a statistically significant negative
relationship between oil rents and non-oil exports, suggesting that countries with higher oil rents
have lower non-oil export shares. Oil rents were also negatively correlated with non-oil export
employment in their regressions. The research methods used in Alsharif et al. (2017) received
some critique from Ross (2019), as the authors failed to report the basis on which the petroleum
exporters were chosen for their analysis. According to (Ross, 2019), the exclusion of some major
oil producers from the study makes it difficult to draw conclusions about global oil production
trends.
In relation to other natural resources, Giri et al. (2019) found evidence that natural resource-
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abundant countries (proxied by total natural resource rents % of GDP) tend to have less diver-
sified exports. Similarly, Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) included mineral rents in their regressions
as a proxy for natural resource endowments. In the models that used the relative Theil index
to measure export diversification, the authors discovered a positive and statistically significant
relationship between mineral rents and export concentration. However, their findings from re-
gressions using the number of export products as the dependent variable contradicted these
findings, as they discovered a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between min-
eral rents and export diversification. As a result, their research yielded no conclusive evidence
of the effect of natural resource endowments on the degree of export diversification.
2.2 Export concentration, income instability and economic growth
Another closely related field of research has focused on studying the relationship between export
concentration and macroeconomic volatility. Jansen (2004) studied the income volatility of small
and developing economies. She argued that export concentration has an impact on terms of trade
volatility, which in turn affects income volatility. Her empirical findings revealed a statistically
significant positive association between export concentration and terms of trade volatility, with
the effect being stronger for exporters focused on commodities such as oil. She obtained a
statistically significant and positive relationship between terms of trade volatility and income
volatility in her other regression. Thus, the results obtained by Jansen (2004) indicate that
export concentration can lead to higher terms of trade volatility, which can translate to higher
income volatility.
Furthermore, Jansen (2004) found out that the size and poorness also matter in terms of
income volatility. According to her econometric results, microstates and poorer economies are
predisposed to have higher income volatility. Jansen (2004) argued that in the case of small
economies, this could be possibly explained by their limited opportunities to diversify their
export base and greater reliance on foreign trade (openness). A closer examination of her data
revealed that while both small and poor economies have high levels of export concentration,
poor economies are less open to trade. As a result, higher income volatility in poor economies
appears to be driven by their higher export concentration.
Lederman and Maloney (2012) reported similar results as Jansen (2004). In their paper, the
authors studied the relationship between macroeconomic volatility and export concentration.
Their hypothesis was based on the idea that commodity dependency is often related to export
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concentration, which can lead to terms of trade volatility, causing intensified macroeconomic
uncertainty. In line with the results obtained by other authors (e.g., Giri et al., 2019; Jansen,
2004; Osakwe & Kilolo, 2018), the estimations of Lederman and Maloney (2012) indicated
that smaller economies were predisposed to have more concentrated exports. Also, poorer and
mineral-abundant economies (economies that depend on mining exports) were significantly asso-
ciated with higher export concentration. Furthermore, their estimations revealed a positive and
statistically significant relationship between export concentration and terms of trade volatility
and trade volatility with GDP per capita growth volatility. Therefore, according to Lederman
and Maloney (2012), higher export concentration could increase terms of trade volatility, which
then affects GDP per capita growth volatility. These results clearly support their initial hypoth-
esis that links commodity dependency with macroeconomic volatility and are in line with the
results obtained by Jansen (2004).
Export diversification and its relationship to economic growth have also received some atten-
tion in the past. Lederman and Maloney (2007) found a negative relationship between export
concentration and economic growth. In contrast to previous econometric results, Lederman and
Maloney (2007) found no evidence of the natural resource curse and argued that export con-
centration rather than natural resource abundance is the factor driving lower economic growth.
Thus, following their argument, natural resource abundance by itself may not be bad for growth,
but rather how they are utilized to support the economic growth in a given country.
The estimations of Agosin (2007) also show a positive relationship between export diver-
sification and economic growth. According to Agosin (2007), one of the benefits of export
diversification is similar to the portfolio effect known in the financial economics literature. By
diversifying its exports, a country can decrease the volatility of export earnings, which ultimately
can contribute to less volatile economic growth. The econometric estimations of Agosin (2007)
gave statistically significant proof of the existence of this portfolio effect.
Similarly, Hesse (2008) found strong evidence that export concentration has negatively af-
fected economic growth in developing countries. According to Hesse (2008), one possible reason
for the negative relationship could be due to their dependence on commodity exports, which are
characterized by volatile prices. Volatile prices could induce uncertainty of prospective future
income and result in non-investment decisions from risk-averse agents in the economy, ultimately
leading to lower rates of economic growth.
Similar results have been obtained by performing time series analysis on a single country
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basis. In the case of Chile, which is heavily reliant on natural resource exports, Herzer and
Nowak-Lehmann D. (2006) found out that export diversification had played a key role in con-
tributing positively to its economic growth during the last half of the 20th century. The authors’
findings support their hypothesis in which export diversification can generate positive externali-
ties for the economy as a result of learning by doing and learning by exporting effects associated
with competing in international markets.
3 Methodology
In this final project, I estimate a fixed-effects regression model to study whether oil producers
have relatively more concentrated exports than other countries. I use two different approaches
in order to answer this question. The first approach uses a dummy variable that identifies the
major oil producers using a production per capita value criteria. A dummy variable approach has
been used before by Jansen (2004). However, in her study, the dummy variables were assigned
only for the 20 major oil exporters according to the definition of UNCTAD, which leaves out
other smaller, but still significant oil producers. The second approach uses oil rents as the
independent variable in the fixed-effects regression models and is used to verify the results that
are obtained using the dummy variable approach. This approach is similar to the one in Alsharif
et al. (2017). The models are estimated for both the Theil index of export diversification and
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of product export concentration to ensure that the results are
robust across alternative measures of export diversification. Following the approaches used in
the previous literature, the dependent variables are log-transformed in all of the models.
Even though these approaches have been used before in this area of research, there are two key
elements that distinguish the empirical strategy used in this study from the existing literature.
First, I use a large unbalanced panel of 154 countries that includes both developed and least
developed economies.2 Most of the research done in the past has used relatively smaller panels
or focused solely on developing economies (e.g. Osakwe & Kilolo, 2018; Jansen, 2004). Secondly,
to identify the oil producers, a dummy variable is assigned to countries with oil and natural gas
production valued at over $300 per capita in a given year. This criterion was used by Ross
(2019) when analyzing the historical trends of export diversification in oil-producing countries.
Following the logic of Ross (2019), this low-level criterion is used to avoid only identifying the
2However, since the data used in the analysis is unbalanced, the estimations that use all independent variables
are obtained using 115 cross-sections (countries).
11
most oil-dependent producers as producer economies and excluding other minor producers with
a possibly higher level of export diversification. Table 5 in appendix A provides a list of the
countries that were assigned a dummy variable in a given year according to this criterion.
The fixed-effects regression model is estimated as follows;
yit = αi + λt +Xitβ + uit (1)
where yit is the dependent variable in logarithms (measure of export diversification), Xit is the
vector of independent variables, β is the vector of parameters, αi and λt account for country
and time fixed effects respectively and uit is the error term.
There are 11 independent variables in both models. Some of the independent variables used in
the models were shown to have a statistically significant relationship with export diversification
by previous empirical research. Other independent variables included in the models have been
used to either capture the effect of oil production on export diversification or are included as
omitting them could cause bias in the estimations. Section 3.1.1 briefly explains the origins of
the variables and the reason for their inclusion in the models.
The country fixed-effects are used to account for unobserved variables that are different
across countries but do not change over time. In contrast, time fixed-effects are used to capture
unobserved variables that are the same across countries but change over time.
The models are estimated using the software package ’plm’ in R. However, as this package
does not currently support any convenient method to obtain standard errors that are robust
to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC), the results obtained by using the ’plm’
function are complemented by HAC (Arellano) standard errors obtained in gretl.
3.1 Data
As there was no existing dataset containing all of the variables used in the econometric models,
the data of the different variables had to be combined from different sources. Naturally, the
data sets used were of different lengths, and the countries included were conditional on the
source of the data. For convenience and to ensure the validity of the robustness checks between
different measures of export diversification, mutual inclusiveness of countries was used as the
main criteria when combining and cleaning the data. Thus, countries that were not included in
all individual datasets were discarded from the analysis. The combined unbalanced panel data
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consists of 154 countries and ranges from 1995 to 2014 (see appendix A, table 4 for the complete
list of countries included in the analysis).
3.1.1 Independent variables
Most of the independent variables used in the fixed-effects regression models are based on the
results obtained in the previous literature. The variables that are included in the models and
are based on existing literature include; oil rents, population, openness to trade, real GDP per
capita, quality of government, fixed telephone subscriptions, manufacturing exports and human
capital. The inclusion of these variables in the models estimated in this study has two specific
goals; to verify the results of the previous literature and to avoid model misspecification.
Oil rents are the sum of oil and natural gas rents and are used to identify the effect of oil
value-added on export concentration following the approach of Alsharif et al. (2017), and to
verify the results obtained using the dummy variable approach. The population is used as a
proxy for the domestic market size, following the approach of some authors (e.g. Giri et al.,
2019; Parteka & Tamberi, 2011; Osakwe & Kilolo, 2018), and is expected to have a negative
relationship on export concentration. Openness to trade is proxied by trade (% GDP) and has
been used before by Agosin et al. (2012), Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) and Giri et al. (2019). As
was briefly discussed in the literature review, the empirical evidence does not seem to agree with
the relationship between trade openness and export diversification, as both negative and positive
correlations have been found with the two variables. However, I anticipate a positive relationship
between these two variables, implying that trade openness increases export concentration. The
logic behind this hypothesis is based on the very simplistic international trade theory mentioned
earlier, where countries can increase their welfare by specializing according to their comparative
advantage and importing other goods.
Real GDP per capita was included in the regression models of Giri et al. (2019) and Parteka
and Tamberi (2011), but its effect was only statistically significant in the latter. This variable
is included assuming that poorer economies might be predisposed to produce a smaller variety
of goods due to possible technical restrictions, which obviously can translate to higher export
concentration.
The quality of government and fixed telephone subscriptions are used as proxies for cor-
ruption and the quality of the country’s infrastructure. Quality of government was included in
the analysis of Giri et al. (2019) and was proved to have a negative and statistically significant
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relationship in some of their regressions. This variable is used in the models, as the quality of
governments can play a massive role in the dynamic allocation of resources into different sectors,
which might also have an effect on the level of export diversification. The effect of government
quality may be intensified with countries that are dependent on few sectors with intense lob-
bying power or where these sectors are a significant source of government revenues. Telephone
subscriptions were used by Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) and Giri et al. (2019). The variable is
expected to have a negative relationship with export concentration. Although the use of fixed
telephone subscriptions as the sole indicator of infrastructure quality may be questionable, the
variable is used because it has previously been shown to have a significant impact on some of
the models estimated by these authors.
Manufacturing exports, which are measured as a percentage of merchandise exports, are used
in order to account for the manufacturing sectors relative importance to external trade. The
manufacturing sector can be considered as a possible source of positive externalities because its
innovation can often be extended to other industries, which can aid in the emergence of new
industries (and thus lower the degree of export concentration). Osakwe and Kilolo (2018) used
a similar approach by including the manufacturing value-added as the share of GDP in their
regressions. Furthermore, human capital has been used as a possible determinant of export
diversification in almost all of the empirical papers summarized in the literature review. I will
use primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollment as proxies for human capital following the
approach of Giri et al. (2019).
The variables that do not appear in the reviewed literature and are included in the models
estimated in this final project are; natural resource rents and the dummy variable for major oil
and natural gas producers. Natural resource rents include all other rents from natural resources
apart from oil and natural gas. As some economies are also heavily specialized in the production
and exports of coal or precious metals, it is possibly relevant to include the variable in the
model. As the dummy variable is assigned according to a criterion that recognizes both oil
and natural gas production, natural gas rents are included in the second model specification
as an independent variable, together with oil rents. This way, the results of the two model
specifications can be kept as comparable as possible. The summary statistics of the variables
used in the models are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
THEIL 3,029 3.352 1.223 1.174 6.417
HHI 3,077 0.322 0.213 0.045 0.983
ICRG 2,515 0.564 0.203 0.139 1.000
Tele 3,077 18.424 18.887 0.000 74.988
oil_gas_valuePOP_2000 3,080 798.916 3,030.446 0.000 40,814.150
PRODUCER 3,080 0.210 0.408 0 1
population 3,080 40,386,545.000 139,990,452.000 217,167 1,364,270,000
PRIMARY 2,635 1.010 0.160 0.209 1.656
SECONDARY 2,214 0.763 0.310 0.053 1.623
TERTIARY 2,065 0.332 0.258 0.002 1.224
OPENNESS 2,988 0.830 0.485 0.0002 4.373
MANUFACTURING 2,655 0.431 0.317 0.00000 3.729
NAT_RENTS 3,056 0.034 0.059 0.000 0.536
GDPPC 3,061 12,647.330 18,198.890 177.130 111,915.000
OIL_RENTS 3,053 0.049 0.113 0.000 0.863
3.1.2 Data sources and further manipulation
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of product export concentration was obtained from the United
Nations conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) data centre. The Theil index of
overall export diversification came from the IMF export diversification and quality database.
It should be mentioned here that the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index included both Switzerland
and Liechtenstein in the same estimation, whereas in the case of the Theil index, whether the
index measure included Liechtenstein in Switzerland’s estimation remains unknown. However,
assuming that this has little to no implications on the validity of the analysis, the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index estimation of Switzerland and Liechtenstein is included as the measure for
Switzerland. In the case of Indonesia, the data was separated into two different rows; Indonesia
and Indonesia (. . . 2002) in the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index. When the data was combined,
these two rows were joined. Furthermore, both export diversification measures only include data
until 2011 in the case of Sudan.3
Population and per capita oil and gas production values were obtained from the Oil and Gas
Data developed by Ross and Mahdavi (2015). Oil rents, gas rents and total natural resource rents
were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The variable
NAT_RENTS was obtained by subtracting the sum of oil and gas rents from the total natural
resource rents. Therefore, the variable NAT_RENTS includes data on all other natural resources
rents, except oil and gas rents.4 The real GDP and trade (openness) data was obtained from the
3In 2011, South Sudan became independent from Sudan.
4This arithmetic operation that was performed in order to obtain the other natural resource rents resulted in
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World Banks WITS database, and the manufacturing exports share from the World Bank World
Development Indicators. Finally, the data on primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollment,
quality of government and fixed telephone subscriptions were obtained from the QoG institute’s
basic dataset. Furthermore, all of the variables that were defined as shares or percentages were
divided by 100 in order to express them as fractions of 100. The variables, their descriptions,
sources and initial ranges are summarized in Appendix A, table 6.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Results with the dummy variable approach
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained using the dummy variable approach. As the data set
used in this study is unbalanced, the models that contain all of the independent variables were
estimated using 115 cross-sectional units. Eight out of the 11 explanatory variables have the
same signs in both models. As was expected, the dummy variable (PRODUCER) that identifies
major oil producer economies according to our criteria has a positive sign in both models. Its
effect on export concentration is statistically significant (at 5%) in the model that uses the Theil
index, but not when export concentration is measured with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.
The population and GDP per capita have negative signs in both models, but their effects are
not statistically significant. Therefore, a larger domestic market and higher demand capacity
could provide a better environment for various sectors to develop, ultimately leading to more
diversified exports. The negative relationship between these two variables and export concentra-
tion is consistent with the findings in the previous research. Openness has the expected positive
sign and is statistically significant at 5% in both models, indicating that the more an economy
trades internationally, the more concentrated its exports are on average. These results support
the hypothesis presented in Section 3.1.1 and are consistent with the findings of Agosin et al.
(2012). Manufacturing has a negative sign in both models and is statistically significant at 10%
in the model that uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as the dependent variable. Therefore,
countries with higher shares of manufacturing exports of their merchandise exports have more
diversified exports on average, according to our estimations. These findings are consistent with
the results obtained in Osakwe and Kilolo (2018).
Furthermore, the effect of human capital on export diversification seems to depend on the
some values that were negative but very close to zero. These negative values were rounded up to zero, as they
were assumed to be a result of very small rounding errors in the variables provided by the World Bank.
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level of education. Primary school enrollment is not statistically significant and has different
signs in the two models. Thus, its effect on export diversification is ambiguous. Secondary school
enrollment has negative signs in both models and is statistically significant at 10% in the model
that uses the Theil index as the dependent variable. Therefore, countries with higher secondary
school enrollment seem to have a more diversified export structure on average. Surprisingly,
tertiary education enrollment has a positive sign and is statistically significant at 10% in both
models. The effect of infrastructure quality and government quality on export diversification is
ambiguous, as they both have differing signs in the two models and lack statistical significance.
This may suggest that the variables chosen are poor determinants of the level of export diversifi-
cation in a country. Therefore, any robust evidence of the effect of infrastructure or government
quality on export diversification cannot be concluded from these estimations.
Finally, natural resource rents have the expected positive sign, and its effect is statistically
significant at 5% in the model that uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as the dependent
variable. This indicates that economies that produce other natural resources have, on average,
more concentrated exports.
4.2 Results with oil rents approach
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results obtained using the oil rents approach. Again, as we
deal with an unbalanced panel, the estimations were obtained using a subset of 115 countries.
The results from the second approach are very similar to the ones that were obtained using
the dummy variable. In both models, the variable oil rents has the expected positive sign and
is statistically significant, but more so in the model that uses the Theil index as the dependent
variable. Thus, according to our estimations, the higher are the rents obtained from oil, the
more concentrated are the exports on average. The population has the expected negative sign
in both models, and its effect is statistically significant at 10% in the model that uses the Theil
index as the dependent variable. GDP per capita also has a negative sign in both models but
lacks statistical significance. The variable openness is statistically significant at 5% and has the
expected positive sign in both models. Manufacturing’s effect is statistically significant at 10%
in the model that uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as the dependent variable, and it has
the predicted negative sign in both models.
As for the human capital, the signs of the variables are the same as they were in the dummy
variable model. Therefore, the impact of primary school enrollment on export concentration
17



























Cross-sectional units 115 115
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes
R2 0.191 0.121
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.014
F Statistic 2.505∗∗∗ (df = 11; 114) 2.816∗∗∗ (df = 11; 114)
Note: Robust (HAC) standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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remains uncertain, while secondary school education has a negative sign in both models. When
oil producers are identified using the oil rents approach, however, the statistical significance of
secondary school enrollment has vanished from the model that uses the Theil index as the de-
pendent variable. Tertiary education still has a surprisingly positive and statistically significant
effect on export concentration. The impact of infrastructure and government quality on export
concentration is still unclear, identical to the previous findings in table 2. Finally, other natural
resource rents have the expected positive sign in both models, with a statistically significant
impact (at 10%) when the Herfindahl-Hirschman is used as the dependent variable.
In conclusion, these estimations obtained by using the oil rents verify the results obtained
in the dummy variable approach.
4.3 Limitations of the study
Using a dummy variable to identify the major oil producer countries presents some limitations
to the study. As the dummy variable is assigned according to a production value per capita
criteria, it establishes a cut off point between which countries are considered as major producers
and the rest of the countries. Therefore, the statistical significance of this variable is conditional
on the value that is used as the minimum criteria for major oil producers. Due to this reason,
the results obtained with the dummy variable approach apply only to oil producers that produce
more than $300 per capita in a given year. However, using oil rents may also not be ideal given
how this variable is defined. As the demand for oil can be considered to be quite inelastic and
the price of oil is volatile, an increase in the price in a given year might artificially make the
export shares look larger while at the same time increasing the rents. Therefore, especially when
the oil price is high, the export basket of oil producers may look more concentrated than before,
even though the quantities exported are the same (Ross, 2019). This may question the practice
of using price-sensitive indexes to assess the real level of export diversification in the case of
highly concentrated oil-producers.
Furthermore, due to data limitations, not all of the variables that have been statistically
important in previous studies could be used in the models. These variables should be included
in the models to achieve the most reliable results, as leaving them out can cause bias in the
estimation results. Also, many of the independent variables that were used in the models could
potentially suffer from endogeneity. However, identifying these variables and finding proper
instruments can be difficult, which is why this method was not applied in this analysis.
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Cross-sectional units 115 115
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes
R2 0.195 0.122
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.015
F Statistic 2.636∗∗∗ (df = 11; 114) 2.957∗∗∗ (df = 11; 114)
Note: Robust (HAC) standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Finally, the results obtained in Section 4 do not address the direct causality of oil production
on export concentration due to possible confounding effects of oil prices and other variables. As
a consequence, at this level of analysis these findings should be regarded as mere correlations
between the two variables.
4.4 Discussion, policy implications and future research
The estimation results in tables 2 and 3 show that oil-producing economies’ exports are relatively
more concentrated than other countries. These findings are robust to two different measures of
export diversification, the Theil index and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index and the variable
identifying oil producers is statistically significant in three out of four models. Also, with these
models, we have been able to verify some of the findings obtained in the previous research.
According to the evidence obtained from the models estimated in this final project, the low
carbon transition forces oil-producing economies to apply strict economic diversification policies
to guarantee sustainable GDP growth in the future. However, these policies present a trade-off
between short and long term well being, as a previously profitable industry has to be gradually
abandoned. The decision to move away from oil production will not be easy in the case of
countries whose GDP is highly dependent on their export revenues, and the outcome of the
diversification process is highly dependent on the relative competitiveness of their other sectors.
Therefore, the economic policies needed to support the diversification from oil depend on each
country’s specific characteristics and abilities.
While using an econometric approach like the fixed-effects models estimated in Section 4
can possibly identify whether oil-producers have relatively more concentrated (less diversified)
exports, it makes no contribution to the identification of the oil-producers whose economies
are better suited to diversify away from oil. Thus, taking this and the limitations presented
in Section 4.3 into account, future research should focus on a case-by-case analysis of heavily
oil-dependent economies that assesses the total risk of low carbon transition on their future




The future export revenues of oil-producing economies are threatened by the ambitious goals
devoted to the low carbon transition. In some of the biggest oil-producing countries, these
export revenues represent significant shares of GDP and fiscal revenues, forcing them to find
other sources of income through diversification. However, the underlying question is whether
this problem extends to other relatively smaller oil producers.
This bachelor’s degree final project has studied the export concentration of oil-producing
countries using an unbalanced panel of 154 countries during 1995–2014. Following the practices
used in previous literature, the aim of this project was to study whether oil-producing countries
have more concentrated exports relative to other countries. A fixed-effects regression model was
estimated using two approaches that captured the effect of oil production on export concentra-
tion. A dummy variable was assigned to countries whose oil and gas production value exceeded
$300 per capita in the first approach. The idea of using this low-level criterion was to include
both the big and small but still relatively important oil producers following the logic developed
by Ross (2019). The second approach followed the methods of Alsharif et al. (2017) and was
used to verify the results obtained in the first approach. In both approaches, oil production
was associated with higher export concentration, and the findings were robust across the two
alternative measures of export diversification used. Furthermore, the effect of oil production on
export concentration was statistically significant in three out of four models estimated.
These findings indicate that export concentration is a problem in major oil-producing coun-
tries that need to be addressed in light of the low-carbon transition’s reduced demand for fossil
fuels. Thus, these countries have to find other sources of revenues in the future in order to
guarantee sustainable economic growth. However, moving away from oil production may not
be easy for countries whose economic growth is highly dependent on their export revenues and
whose other sectors lack international competitiveness.
As was discussed shortly in Section 4.3, this research is subject to some limitations. First,
the results obtained with the dummy variable are conditional on the value that is used as
the minimum criteria for major oil producers. Secondly, the second approach may not be
ideal when identifying oil producer economies due to the way in how the variable is defined.
Other limitations are born from the unavailability and restrictions in the data and the possible
endogeneity of some variables. Furthermore, due to the possible confounding impact of oil prices
22
and other variables, the direct causality between higher oil production and export concentration
cannot be addressed, making the interpretation of the findings mere correlations at this level of
analysis.
Given these limitations and the fixed-effects models’ inability to recognize the unique charac-
teristics of individual countries, future research should focus on a case-by-case country analysis
that emphasizes the actual risk imposed by the low-carbon transition and the potential policies
that can help to achieve more diverse exports in the future.
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Table 4: Full list of countries included in the data.
List of Countries
1. Afghanistan 2. Albania
3. Algeria 4. Angola
5. Argentina 6. Armenia
7. Australia 8. Austria
9. Azerbaijan 10. Bahamas, The
11. Bahrain 12. Bangladesh
13. Barbados 14. Belarus
15. Belgium 16. Belize
17. Benin 18. Bhutan
19. Bolivia 20. Bosnia and Herzegovina
21. Brazil 22. Brunei
23. Bulgaria 24. Burkina Faso
25. Burundi 26. Cambodia
27. Cameroon 28. Canada
29. Cape Verde 30. Central African Republic
31. Chad 32. Chile
33. China 34. Colombia
35. Comoros 36. Congo, Rep.
37. Costa Rica 38. Cote d’Ivoire
39. Croatia 40. Cuba
41. Cyprus 42. Czech Republic
43. Denmark 44. Dominican Republic
45. Ecuador 46. Egypt
47. El Salvador 48. Eritrea
49. Estonia 50. Ethiopia
51. Finland 52. France
53. Gabon 54. Gambia, The
55. Georgia 56. Germany
57. Ghana 58. Greece
59. Guatemala 60. Guinea
61. Guinea-Bissau 62. Guyana
63. Honduras 64. Hungary
65. Iceland 66. India
67. Indonesia 68. Iran
69. Iraq 70. Ireland
71. Israel 72. Italy
73. Jamaica 74. Japan
75. Jordan 76. Kazakhstan
77. Kenya 78. Korea, Rep.
79. Kuwait 80. Kyrgyzstan
81. Lao P.D.R. 82. Latvia
83. Lebanon 84. Lesotho
85. Libya 86. Lithuania
87. Luxembourg 88. Madagascar
89. Malawi 90. Malaysia
91. Maldives 92. Mali
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93. Malta 94. Mauritania
95. Mauritius 96. Mexico
97. Moldova 98. Mongolia
99. Morocco 100. Mozambique
101. Myanmar 102. Namibia
103. Nepal 104. Netherlands
105. New Zealand 106. Nicaragua
107. Niger 108. Nigeria
109. Norway 110. Oman
111. Pakistan 112. Panama
113. Papua New Guinea 114. Paraguay
115. Peru 116. Philippines
117. Poland 118. Portugal
119. Qatar 120. Romania
121. Russia 122. Rwanda
123. Saudi Arabia 124. Senegal
125. Sierra Leone 126. Singapore
127. Slovakia 128. Slovenia
129. Solomon Islands 130. South Africa
131. Spain 132. Sri Lanka
133. Sudan 134. Suriname
135. Sweden 136. Switzerland
137. Tajikistan 138. Tanzania
139. Thailand 140. Togo
141. Tunisia 142. Turkey
143. Turkmenistan 144. Uganda
145. Ukraine 146. United Arab Emirates
147. United Kingdom 148. United States
149. Uruguay 150. Uzbekistan
151. Venezuela 152. Vietnam
153. Zambia 154. Zimbabwe
Table 5: List of countries with per capita oil and natural gas
production valued at over $300 (constant 2000 US$).
Country Per capita oil and natural gas production > $300
1. Algeria 1995 – 2014
2. Angola 1995 – 1997, 1999 – 2014
3. Argentina 2000 – 2014
4. Australia 1995 – 1997, 2000 – 2014
5. Azerbaijan 2000 – 2014
6. Bahrain 1995 – 2014
7. Belize 2008, 2011 – 2012
8. Bolivia 2004 – 2008, 2013 – 2014
9. Brazil 2011 – 2014
10. Brunei 1995 – 2014
11. Canada 1995 – 2014
12. Chad 2005 – 2006, 2008, 2011
13. Colombia 2005 – 2014
14. Congo, Rep. 1995 – 2014
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15. Denmark 1995 – 2014
16. Ecuador 2000, 2003 – 2014
17. Egypt 2005 – 2008, 2011
18. Gabon 1995 – 2014
19. Iran 1995 – 2014
20. Iraq 1997 – 2014
21. Kazakhstan 1999 – 2014
22. Kuwait 1995 – 2014
23. Libya 1995 – 2014
24. Malaysia 1995 – 2014
25. Mexico 1996 – 1997, 2000 – 2014
26. Netherlands 1995 – 1998, 2000 – 2014
27. New Zealand 2000 – 2001, 2003, 2005 – 2014
28. Nigeria 2004 – 2007, 2008, 2010 – 2014
29. Norway 1995 – 2014
30. Oman 1995 – 2014
31. Qatar 1995 – 2014
31. Russia 1995 – 2014
32. Saudi Arabia 1995 – 2014
33. Senegal 1995 – 2001, 2005
34. Sudan 2008, 2010 – 2011
35. Suriname 2005 – 2014
36. Tunisia 2008
37. Turkmenistan 1995 – 2014
38. United Arab Emirates 1995 – 2014
39. United Kingdom 1995 – 2000, 2003 – 2006, 2008
40. United States 1995 – 1997, 1999 – 2014
41. Uzbekistan 2000 – 2008, 2010
42. Venezuela 1995 – 2014
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Table 6: Variables, their description, sources and data range.
Variable Variable description Source Range
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of export
product concentration. A higher value
in the index indicates higher export
product concentration.
UNCTADStat 1995 – 2018
Theil Theil index of export diversification
(Overall). A higher value in the in-
dex indicates lower export diversifica-
tion (higher concentration).
IMF 1962 – 2014
population Population, total Ross, Michael; Mah-
davi, Paasha, 2015, "Oil
and Gas Data"
1932 – 2014
oil_gas_valuePOP_2000 Oil and gas value per capita in constant
2000 US dollars. Used to obtain the
dummy variable ’PRODUCER’.
Ross, Michael; Mah-
davi, Paasha, 2015, "Oil
and Gas Data"
1932 – 2014
PRODUCER Dummy variable assigned for countries
whose per capita oil and gas produc-
tion value was higher than 300 (con-
stant 2000 US dollars) in a given year.
Ross, Michael; Mah-
davi, Paasha, 2015, "Oil
and Gas Data"
1932 – 2014





GDPPC Gross Domestic Product Per Capita.
Calculated by dividing the real GDP
obtained from the WITS database with
the population obtained from the Ross
& Mahdavi Oil and Gas Data.
See above. 1995 – 2014
MANUFACTURING Manufactures exports (% of merchan-
dise exports)
World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
1962 – 2019
Oil rents Oil rents (% GDP). Difference between
the value of crude oil production and
costs as a share of GDP.
World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
1970 – 2018
Gas rents Natural gas rents (% GDP). Difference
between the value of natural gas pro-
duction and costs as a share of GDP.
World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
1970 – 2018
Total natural rents Total natural resource rents (% GDP).
The sum of all natural resource rents,
including oil, natural gas, coal, mineral
and forest rents.
World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
1970 – 2018
NAT_RENTS Total natural resource rents excluding
oil and gas rents. Calculated by sub-
tracting oil and gas rents from total
natural resource rents.
World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
1970 – 2018
OIL_RENTS Calculated from the World Bank World
Development Indicators data by sum-
ming up the oil and gas rents.
World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators
1970 – 2018
PRIMARY Primary school enrollment (% gross)
(wdi_gerp). The variable is used as a
proxy for human capital.
The QoG Institute, Ba-
sic Dataset
1946 – 2020
SECONDARY Secondary school enrollment (% gross)
(wdi_gers). The variable is used as a
proxy for human capital.
The QoG Institute, Ba-
sic Dataset
1946 – 2020
TERTIARY Tertiary school enrollment (% gross)
(wdi_gert). The variable is used as a
proxy for human capital.
The QoG Institute, Ba-
sic Dataset
1946 – 2020
ICRG Indicator of quality of government
(icrg_qog). This indiator rages from
0 to 1, where higher values indicate
higher quality of government.
The QoG Institute, Ba-
sic Dataset
1946 – 2020
Tele Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100
people) (wdi_tele). Used as a proxy for
infrastructure quality.
The QoG Institute, Ba-
sic Dataset
1946 – 2020
OPENNESS Trade (% of GDP). The variable ac-
counts for external trade dependency.
WITS (World Inte-
grated Trade Solution)
1988 – 2018
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